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This essay discusses how Schelling’s work up to 1809 gets appropriated and
simplified by, but functions as a fifth column for, British Idealists interested
in Naturphilosophie. Focusing on Coleridge (1772–1834) and his friend and
executor, the Germanophile professor of anatomy and surgery, Joseph Henry
Green (1791–1863), I explore the pressure the life sciences put on philosophy
and the constraining of both by religious imperatives that are internal, conceptual
censors, and external (cultural and institutional) censors. Though beyond my
chronological parameters, Green’s protégé, Richard Owen (1804–1892),
foremost biologist of the Victorian period before Darwin, is also relevant for
idealist biology and transcendental anatomy. Unlike Kant and Hegel, Schelling
remained virtually untranslated in nineteenth-century Britain, though he was
taken up, and more diversely, in America. But Coleridge, Green, and Owen all
read German, while Green and Owen also knew work by Cuvier and Carus.
Green, a less complex and peripatetic and more public intellectual figure than
Coleridge, met Coleridge in 1817 through Tieck; they read Schelling intensively
in 1818 after Tieck arranged for Green to study German philosophy in Berlin with
Solger in 1817; and for 10 years after Coleridge’s nervous turn against Schelling
in 1818, they discussed issues arising from Naturphilosophie. Coleridge’s own
interest in Schelling began in 1806, and despite later disavowals that when he
credited Schelling with a ‘revolution in philosophy,’ he knew only the
1800 System of Transcendental Idealism (STI), by 1816 he probably owned 11
texts by Schelling.11. Coleridge, Notebooks, 2.2784; Biographia Literaria, 163;
and ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.344.View all notes These
spanned Naturphilosophie, transcendental philosophy, and religion and included
the Freedom essay, and in the following years, Coleridge tried to acquire as
much of Schelling’s work as possible.22. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 4.665.View
all notes
The Coleridgeans were drawn to German Idealism’s idea of nature as selfdeveloping but wanted to see a unity of plan in this process. This desideratum
culminated in Owen’s adaptation of the vertebrate archetype from Carus, which
allowed him to ‘personif[y]’ nature as advancing ‘from the first embodiment of the
Vertebrate idea … [to] the Human form,’ ‘guided by the archetypal light.’33.
Owen, On Limbs, 86.View all notesBut the tension between natural detail and
divine plan is intimated in the ‘Recapitulatory Lecture’ for Green’s 1827 course on
the medico-naturalist thinker John Hunter (1728–1793), where Green writes that
a ‘history of nature’ may begin inductively with the ‘lowest,’ ‘nature,’ or
deductively with the ‘highest’ or ‘First cause & ground of all,’ God.44. Green,
‘Birds,’ 313; cf. His 1828 lecture in Vital Dynamics, 102–4.View all notes We will
return to this history of nature that Green calls ‘physiogony’; but if nature is
autogenetic, there is no guarantee where it may go. Hence, Schelling speaks of
nature ‘evolv[ing] itself out of its own powers’ in a ‘terrible loneliness.’ Moreover,

he sees a ‘polarity’ in the world-process, which is not a synthesis of opposites but
a ‘duplicity’ and possible ‘diremption.’55. Schelling, Ages of the World, 104;
and First Outline, 39, 139.View all notes Both Green and Coleridge recognize
this diremption when they see ‘integration’ and ‘individuation’ as ‘polar forces’ in
nature’s ‘evolution’ from the lowest to highest, since in individuation the ‘nisus of
each detach[es] itself from the preceding or more imperfect States.’66.
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 507, 515, 557; and Green, ‘Birds,’ 310.View all
notes For if the higher detaches itself from the lower in what Schelling in his
1799 First Outline (FO) calls the Stufenfolge or graduated stages of nature, the
lower can also dis-integrate itself from the procession towards the higher.
Each nisus can detach itself from the progress of ‘nature as subject’ or natura
naturans,77. Schelling, First Outline, 17.View all notesforming objects or
hypostases that may start new series that do not form part of an ascent.
Put simply, unity of plan and biodiversity are incompatible. Hence, when the
Coleridgeans took over Naturphilosophie’s conception of individual organisms
and nature as self-organizing, they kept a ‘designing power’ for God.88.
Richards, Romantic Conception, 518.View all notes They were supported in this
by the legacy of the Cambridge Platonists, who posited a ‘plasticity’ in nature, but
as a lower power that accounted for a certain blind or random variance under
God’s distant oversight.99. Hunter, ‘Plastic Nature,’ 202–9.View all
notes Significantly in his 1827 Hunterian lectures, Green had said that
to deduce a history of nature was a branch of ‘Theology,’ which he wanted to
keep separate from science. But in his 1828 lectures, on the edge of the
Bridgewater Treatises commissioned in 1829 to reconcile the new sciences with
natural theology, Green drops the bounding off of theology as well as any
troublesome references to the ‘nisus’ of individuation.1010. Compare Green,
‘Birds,’ 313 with Vital Dynamics, 102–5.View all notes By contrast, recognizing
this power of individuation, which Leibniz also saw in the infinite divisibility of
monads, Schelling says that within every ‘sphere other spheres are again
formed, and in these spheres others.’ In terms of ‘Nature as subject,’ these
‘individual products’ are ‘abortive attempts.’1111. Schelling, First Outline, 41, 41n,
44.View all notesYet besides this ‘perspective … for the whole of organic nature,’
there is also one for the ‘individual,’ which Schelling feels compelled to ‘recover.’
To be sure, Nature perceives the individual’s ‘deviation’ as ‘disease,’ but as
Schelling ironically adds, ‘life’ itself must then be a disease and a ‘state extorted
from Nature.’1212. Ibid., 158–60, 160n.View all notes
Schelling himself is torn between the universal and, particular, transcendental
and natural philosophy. In STI, where nature is ‘the unconscious poetry’ of
‘spirit,’1313. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 12.View all
notes nature’s autopoiesisresembles the artistry and ‘plastick’ power posited by
Robinet and Cudworth to accommodate variance within a higher plan. But as

Schelling gets into nature’s details, transcendental and natural philosophy cease
to be ‘one science’ differentiated only by their ‘opposite orientation.’1414.
Schelling, ‘Introduction to the Outline,’ 194.View all notes Coleridge himself
recognizes that the very concept of self-organization enfolds a possible
diremption of natural from transcendental philosophy, when he comments on the
dangers of positing ‘an unconscious activity that acts intelligently without
intelligence.’1515. Coleridge, ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.374.View
all notes That Schelling was a plastic, protean thinker who opened these dangers
is one reason Coleridge ends his Lectures on the History of Philosophy without
discussing Schelling, complaining that he can be rhizomatically found in Kant,
Spinoza, Plotinus, and Proclus, thus frustrating ‘a true account.’1616.
Coleridge, History of Philosophy, 2.506, 588–90.View all notes Interestingly,
Hegel also criticizes Schelling’s refusal to be reduced to a single system,1717.
Hegel, History of Philosophy, 3.515.View all notes even as he ends his own
history of philosophy with Schelling as the impossibility of concluding
philosophy’s history.
Yet paradoxically a simplified Schelling is used by British Idealism to give the life
sciences philosophical weight, while inoculating them against the questions
catalyzed by the feedback loop between science and philosophy. This involution
of philosophy in science also has consequences for religion in
the Freedom essay that disturb Coleridge, despite his high praise for this text in
1812.1818. Coleridge, ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.402.View all
notesFor unlike the more piecemeal twentieth-century reception of Schelling,
Coleridge and Green saw that science, philosophy, politics, and religion form an
architectonic in which different fields are so invisibly intertwined that unsettling
one part destabilizes the whole edifice. The desired integration of different fields
through a closed system of metaphoric transfers is apparent in the way Coleridge
and his medical friends Green and John Abernethy adapt physiological to
sociopolitical notions of ‘constitution,’ anxiously making the sciences of nature
serve ‘spirit,’1919. Green, Vital Dynamics, xxii–iii.View all notes a term they could
channel in secular directions without forfeiting its religious aura. Contrarily, the
contamination with which other fields threaten religion is apparent in the
Bridgewater treatises’ concerted plan of neutralizing multiple sciences, with an
awareness that bio- and geo-diversity are homologous with polytheism, because
they unsettle the idea of a single creation and unity of plan across species and
ages.2020. Amundson, Changing Role of Embryo, 63–7.View all notes
In the larger arc of British Idealism’s attempt to contain its more speculative,
German counterpart and deploy it within this immunitary apparatus, there was a
first (Romantic) phase dominated by Schelling and a second (Victorian) phase
which selectively took up Hegel. Theorizing the ‘self-confuting logic’ of the
immunitary apparatus, the contemporary philosopher Roberto Esposito suggests

that in the nineteenth century there was a ‘dialectical circuit between political
position and scientific research which projected conceptual references from one
sphere onto the other.’ Through this ‘short-circuit’ (an example being the way
‘constitution’ moves between Abernethy’s work on constitutional diseases and
Coleridge’s On the Constitution of Church and State), ‘the “political body”’ closes
‘within itself’ against its ‘outside,’2121. Esposito, Immunitas, 130, 147; and Bios,
158.View all notes contracting the intellectual sphere as well. In the first phase,
this short-circuit occurs through natural theology as a reconciliation of science
and God deeply underwritten by political anxieties. But in the Coleridgeans’
attempt to synthesize natural philosophy and religion, Schelling proves
a pharmakon. The result in the second phase is a forgetting of natural within
political theology, through a turn to Hegel focalized through his logic and theory
of the state rather than his aesthetics or philosophy of nature.
Here it is worth mentioning the polymathic, though radically empirical, work of
Hunter, who stands behind the urgency of dealing with nature in the first phase.
Hunter was an encyclopedic thinker whose work spanned medicine, physiology,
comparative anatomy, and geology: one who, in typically Romantic fashion,
wanted to create a system but held back from publication and definitive
organization. In scope if not style his work rivals the more theoretical projects of
Hegel and Schelling in traversing all knowledge in the life sciences. In 1799, the
Crown purchased his collection of fossils and healthy and diseased body parts,
and the life sciences thus became a national trust, resulting in the Hunterian
Museum at the Royal College of Surgeons, Hunterian lecture series, and
‘orations’ on Hunter’s birthday. To complicate matters, though much of Hunter’s
medico-physiological work was collected and published (but not till 1835), his
brother-in-law Sir Everard Home burned Hunter’s notes on the specimens in
1823. The general view is that Home plagiarized the work, but he himself said he
wanted to protect Hunter from charges of irreligion. In this vacuum, ‘Hunter’
became a metonym for the problem of how to manage life: practically, by
considering the past and future of British medicine, or intellectually, by organizing
his work to resolve the insidious question of what constitutes life. Those who
wanted to see Hunter’s empiricism not as materialism but as demonstrating
some kind of ‘spirit,’ organized and theorized his work according to a combination
of Cuvierian taxonomy and the graduated stages of nature. Though
the Stufenfolge was not unique to Idealism, Schelling’s development of it was
crucial to Hunter’s philosophical interpreters.
Coleridge is the most interesting here but plays a hidden role, as his Theory of
Life (TL), written much earlier,2222. The date usually assumed is 1816–1817, but
McFarland (2002McFarland, T. ‘Prolegomena’ to S.T. Coleridge, Opus
Maximum. Edited by Thomas McFarland. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002. [Google Scholar]) argues that TLwas written in 1819

(‘Prolegomena,’ ccviii–ix).View all notes was not published till 1848. More in the
forefront are Green, who gave Hunterian lectures and orations, and Owen, also a
High Church man, who was hired to arrange the collection, becoming sole
Hunterian lecturer in 1837.2323. For the religious and political affiliations of Green,
Owen and the ‘Germano–Coleridgeans’ see Desmond, The Politics of Evolution,
26–75, 352–72.View all notes Hunter’s work crystallized on the British scene the
threat posed by the life sciences to religion and was the object of fierce debates
over ‘life,’ notably the contention between Abernethy and the materialist William
Lawrence which sparked Coleridge’s text. Yet there is little in Hunter to support
an ascent of man where nature gradually sheds the counter-memory or
phylogenetic traces of lower organisms, and in FO Schelling only writes this idea
under erasure. Though Hunter pre-dates Schelling, Schelling knew his work, and
just as Naturphilosophie proved a thorn in the flesh of transcendental philosophy,
Hunter was a fifth column in British science.2424. See Rajan, ‘Asystasy,’ for
elaboration, as well as discussion of how Hunter and Schelling can be
connected.View all notesAmong the concerns he shares with the Germans is an
interest in the self-organization of life as it develops from matter in a process that
has no clear evolutionary line and an uncertain sense of the relation between
matter and ‘spirit’ (as the name for a vital principle that is obscure, ungrounded,
and aleatory). Related to this is his sense that normal and pathological life
processes may be entwined, evidence for which lies in his many surgical case
studies, where life and mortification come perilously close. In the appendix on
disease in Schelling’s FO and the last section of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,
we find a similar proximity between disease and life that imperils the movement
from nature to spirit. Nor does Hunter’s physiology support the graduated series
of ‘powers’ and ‘functions’ that Schelling and Coleridge wanted to find in
bodies.2525. Schelling, First Outline, 149, 159; and Coleridge, Theory of Life, 495,
526.View all notes Moreover, in general Hunter’s work on the body’s ramifying
subsystems, paralleled in Schelling’s physiology in FO, forces us to rethink the
tangled nature of systems, raising problems for the all-encompassing intellectual
system that Coleridge sought in German Idealism2626. Coleridge, Collected
Letters, 4.667.View all notes: problems mirrored in Coleridge’s attempts to crisscross innumerable fields of knowledge in his Notebooks.
Green uses Schelling expediently to contain Hunter, but together they make an
explosive cocktail. Hunter gives empirical depth to Schelling’s ‘tormented
idealism,’2727. Krell, Contagion, 24.View all notes while Schelling helps to phrase
philosophically the issues raised by Hunter’s radical empiricism. Thus in British
Idealism’s second phase, it becomes easier to turn to a rationalized Hegel,
purged of his philosophy of nature, which was left untranslated till 1970.2828.
William Wallace translated Parts 1 and 3 of the Encyclopedia (1873, 1894) but
not the Philosophy of Nature. Twentieth-century translations of the three Jena
systems also scrupulously omit the sections on nature.View all notes Of note

here is work by Stirling, McTaggart, Caird, Bosanquet, and others. In this phase,
Schelling is still read (and indeed Oken and Oersted were translated), but his
volatile Naturphilosophie is firmly contained as a ‘subordinate or applied
department’ of ‘transcendental philosophy’ by commentators like John Watson
who exported British Idealism to Canada.2929. Watson, Schelling’s
Transcendental Idealism, 92.View all notes Indeed, Naturphilosophie becomes a
way of marginalizing Schelling, as the Hegelian state could realize spirit more
safely. Just as the state and ethics close off the dangers of Naturphilosophie,
Hegel’s logic is used to resist the existential and esoteric tendencies of the late
Schelling, whose religion was insufficiently allied with civil society. That ‘Hegel’
becomes more respectable for Anglo-American philosophy in the long run should
not distract us from their early continuity in the mission of British Idealism. For as
natural theology mutates into political theology, Hegel does the figural work
intended for ‘Schelling,’ only better, because he has been better streamlined.
For Esposito, ‘political-theology,’ or what Carl Schmitt discerns as the
persistence of theological structures in modernity, is part of the social body’s selfprotective immunitary apparatus. These structures, including the corporation of a
college like the RCS, considered as ‘a collective person’ or ‘legal body’ in which
power passes uninterruptedly from Father to Son, survive so invisibly in
discourses and institutions that one is unaware of being incorporated in their
‘web.’ Consequently, though theology and secularization seem opposed, the two
remain within ‘the same horizon.’ The isomorphism of the political and theological
works bilaterally, as theology determines and is determined by the political and
its domains: class, structures of authority and thought, and hierarchies of mental
faculties and academic fields. British Idealism’s turn to Hegel because he was
more modern exemplifies this rechannelling of theological into politico-intellectual
structures that do not give up a hidden religious validation. This transfer, as
Esposito suggests, occurred more efficiently in Protestantism, which had
preserved theology as political theology, than in Catholicism which had to
undergo a ‘tragic revolutionary break’ to enter modernity, exposing the ‘aporetic’
way that politics and theology are ‘bound together’ in dis-correspondence.3030.
Esposito, Two, 3, 23–24, 33, 54–5, 77.View all notes Doubtless this is why the
mid-Victorian wave of British Idealism, though in some cases theologically
centered, never took up the late Schelling. For although political theology was in
play in Schelling’s appointment to Hegel’s chair, Schelling’s work from
the Freedom essay onwards revolves around this dis-correspondence, where
philosophy and religion are each used to think the other from the outside.
Green is a neglected figure in the transition within British Idealism. For it was he
who laid the basis for Germano–Coleridgean thought as a political theology by
passing on his mantle to Owen and constructing a clerisy with Coleridge as
Father in subtitling his last book as ‘founded’ on the master’s ‘teaching.’

Spanning the Romantic and Victorian periods, Green also effects
the Aufhebung of natural into political theology. Green gave the Hunterian
lectures from 1824–1828, but it was not till 1840 that he published Vital
Dynamics, a retrospect which combined his Oration of that year with earlier
papers, including the last (1828) version of the ‘Recapitulatory Lecture’ for his
courses, which forms the basis of his Oration. Vital Dynamics is followed by
Green’s second Hunterian Oration, Mental Dynamics (1847), and then the
posthumous Spiritual Philosophy (1865), edited by his pupil, which brings
Coleridge’s ‘teaching’ to the threshold of British Idealism’s second phase.
Green knew the work of Kant, Schelling, and Carus. But since he went to Berlin
in the year Solger helped appoint Hegel and owned a copy of the Logic, he may
also have had some knowledge of Hegel. An attenuated Hegelian influence is
suggested by the fact that the movement from nature to spirit enacted
between Vital and Mental Dynamics is more Hegelian than Schellingian. To be
sure the transition is titular, since Mental Dynamics has little to do with
psychology or any other ‘philosophical’ sciences. Also reminiscent of Hegel is
Green’s interest in an encyclopedic Bildung that traverses all the disciplines,
since Mental Dynamics combines the Idealist program with
the trivium and quadriviumto outline a general curriculum for the education of a
medical clerisy. Again, Green’s orientation is pragmatic, not speculative, as he
(perhaps) added on a simplified Hegel to a Platonised Schelling.3131. See
Green, Vital Dynamics, xxi.View all notes
Vital Dynamics aims to recognize Hunter as a ‘philosophical physiologist’ in a
Kantian sense and thus to elevate the life sciences into philosophical sciences
with higher aims than the pragmatic ones emphasized by other orators.3232. Ibid.,
v–ix, xiv–xv.View all notes For this purpose, Green invokes the ‘dynamic’
philosophy of the Germans and specifically Schelling. Alluding to FO, which he
read with Coleridge, Green elides its complexity by glossing it through Schelling’s
more transcendentally idealist comments, in On University Studies, on
comparative anatomy as the unity and affinity of all organisms.3333. Ibid.,
38n.View all notes Crucial to Green’s organization of scientific knowledge is the
schema of physiography, physiology, and physiogony which he used in two of his
lecture series. Physiography is mere natural history or natura naturata.
Physiology studies the ‘laws,’ ‘powers,’ and ‘forces’ common to ‘living bodies’ and
is natura naturans since, although Green omits plants from his Naturphilosophie,
he does evoke ‘Nature’ in a general sense. Though Green saw his lectures as
mainly physiographical, it is physiology that moves beyond phenomena, making
biology a philosophical and not just empirical science. But the third and most
important mode is physiogony, which projects Nature ‘as an agent, acting under
the analogy of a will,’ thus making the jump from purposiveness to teleology.
Physiogony studies how nature ‘labours in birth with man,’ working up from

‘the polypi to the mammalia,’ and making nature a ‘preface and portion of the
history of man,’ and ‘branch of self-knowledge.’ Its ‘History of Nature’ is a series
of Aufhebungen, which allows us to discover in the past, as ‘so many embryonic
states of the organism,’ the ‘solution of the present, and in both the anticipation of
the future.’3434. Ibid., 101–4.View all notes
Green gets two of his terms from Kant, but Kant’s use of physiogony in a footnote
is inconsequential. More relevant is Schelling, who complains that
Kant’s Naturgeschichte is a mere Naturbeschreibung. Schelling thus wants to
give ‘natural history’ ‘a much higher meaning,’ that of a ‘history of Nature [eine
Geschichte der Natur selbst].’ Hence his teleological hypothesis of
the Stufenfolge whereby Nature ‘brings forth the whole multiplicity of its products
through continuous deviations from a common ideal’ which it realizes ‘in the
whole’ rather than the ‘individual.’3535. Schelling, First Outline, 53; for a fuller
discussion see Rajan, ‘Evolution and its Resistances,’ 161–2.View all
notes Green specifically responds to Schelling when he describes ‘Natural
History’ as ‘a misnomer, an erratum in the nomenclature of science,’3636.
Green, Vital Dynamics, 107.View all notes naming a new science, physiogony, to
ground the analogy of nature and spirit as an evolutionary sequence. Coleridge
makes a similar comment on the day Green first theorized physiogony in his
1827 ‘Recapitulatory Lecture.’ But otherwise, Coleridge’s use of physiogony is
theological and not natural-historical, and he does not put it into a disciplinary
series including physiography and physiology.3737. Coleridge, Notebooks,
5.5478, 5489, 5510, 5518, 5522.View all notes It seems, then, that Green is
responsible for naming this new science. For not only is Green more teleotheological than Schelling, and not only does he hypostatize Schelling’s
speculation, using it to narrativize Hunter, whose work is more like the networks
of fields in the Outline itself. Throughout Vital Dynamics, Green also simplifies
and streamlines Coleridge, to make natural theology the foundation of political
theology. Thus where Coleridge sees the two tendencies in nature’s evolution –
individuation and integration – as polar forces, Green synthesizes them.3838.
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 515; and Green, Vital Dynamics, 38–9.View all
notes And it is Green, more than Coleridge, who directs Abernethy’s work on
constitutional diseases towards political and social constitution,3939. Green, Vital
Dynamics, xxii–iii.View all notes making explicit the political theology that had
always underlain natural theology.
In the light of Mental Dynamics, Vital Dynamics seems a retrospect that
organizes the life sciences to move beyond them. This recapitulation is possible
because it distills Green’s previous work without the details of his lectures from
the 1820s. Green’s evocations of Idealism, anglicized under the cloak of ‘Hunter,’
are similarly schematic. Where in Hegel’s Encyclopedia nature keeps returning in
the sciences of spirit (anthropology and psychology), Mental Dynamics focuses

on education, not philosophy. Recapitulation in biology is a deeply economic
concept, sparing nature from having to go through all the stages again in each
individual organism, and sparing thought from what Coleridge calls
‘incipien[ce].’4040. Coleridge, Notebooks, 4.4517.View all notes Coleridge is more
fraught, the key text being TL, published without the knowledge of Green, who
might not have wanted to represent Coleridge by anything unsystematic.4141.
McFarland, ‘Prolegomena,’ cxlv–vi.View all notesWhile commentators assume
Green did not know TL,4242. Levere, however, suggests Coleridge revised TL in
conjunction with Green’s 1824 Hunterian lectures (Poetry Realized in Nature,
44–5).View all notes Vital Dynamics responds so closely to it that it seems rather
a silent natural-theological correction of Coleridge.
Coleridge is more complex. His reading of Schelling was ambitiously
interdisciplinary but is best known for his borrowings from STI in Biographia
Literaria (BL). According to Orsini what attracted Coleridge in BL was Schelling’s
‘inclusion of nature in the system of absolute mind’: his ‘dynamic philosophy,’
which repudiated ‘realism’ by making nature ‘unawakened mind’ and mind
‘nature that has achieved’ self-consciousness.4343. Orsini, Coleridge and German
Idealism, 198–200.View all notes But the texts supporting this reading – STI and
the 1799 Introduction to the Outline – do not represent the Naturphilosophie, as
Schelling worked simultaneously with multiple possible systems, this radical
openness being the ‘freedom’ he confers on the ‘absolute subject’ in his Erlangen
Lectures.4444. Schelling, ‘Nature of Philosophy,’ 217–20.View all notes Though
this seems unrecognized by Coleridgeans, FO and its Introduction are radically
different texts: the latter is a supplement published after the text it introduces and
tries to put what Hegel describes as nature’s ‘ever-increasing wealth of detail’
which is ‘recalcitrant to the Unity of the Notion’ back into a system of identity.4545.
Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, 444.View all notes As such, its desired
correspondence of natural and transcendental philosophy is hypothetical. Indeed,
when Schelling says in FO that to ‘philosophize about nature means as much as
to create it,’ this is no statement of correlationist idealism, but indicates that
everything is in construction, or that there are no Kantian a priori categories of
mind. Mind is a fold in nature, and as it thinks about nature, the forms that mind
takes are created by new forms in which nature causes it to think. But this can
happen only if mind constructs a nature that is itself in ‘configuration,’ for it would
be ‘impossible to get a glimpse of the internal construction of Nature’ if we did not
attempt a speculative ‘invasion … through freedom,’ as a ‘question put to Nature’
to which it responds.4646. Schelling, First Outline, 5–6; and ‘Introduction to the
Outline,’ 196–7.View all notes It is in this doubly constructivist sense, and not in
the conventional sense of identity assumed by Coleridgean commentators, that
Schelling says ‘the system of nature’ is simultaneously ‘the system of our
mind.’4747. Schelling, Ideas, 30.View all notes

For Schelling transcendental and natural philosophy are potencies of each other,
quantitatively different, perhaps also qualitatively, but not in a hierarchical way.
Coleridge, by contrast, is a dualist. Or he is uncertainly a monist in the
locodescriptive poetry and scientific prose (including letters) which are his
equivalent of the Naturphilosophie, but a dualist in his need to reassert a higher
term: God, mind, or imagination. Thus in BL, the primary imagination or
perception is a ‘repetition’ in the human mind of the ‘eternal act of creation in the
infinite I AM’ whose self-grounding is mirrored in a Fichtean I that Coleridge calls
will, while the secondary or aesthetic imagination is an ‘echo’ of the primary. Lest
even this schema of emanation rather than potencies veer too close to the
monism that is also what draws him to the dynamic philosophy, Coleridge then
asserts an absolute dualism between imagination as vital and fancy as
mechanical, and between imagination and the ‘objects’ it ‘struggles’ to idealize
and unify, which are ‘fixed and dead.’4848. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 304–
5.View all notes This division between organic and inorganic would be
unthinkable for Schelling. The theory of imagination implodes because it cannot
hold the poles of a dynamic philosophy and an immunitary dualism together.
Nevertheless, the common wisdom accepts Coleridge’s own ingenuous
explanation that when writing BL he was misled by having read only STI,
otherwise Schelling himself would have put him ‘on guard.’4949.
Coleridge, Collected Letters, 4.874.View all notes Yet we know that by 1812 he
had also read the Freedom essay. When Coleridge later read Schelling
intensively with Green in 1818, he supposedly rethought his earlier, undigested
enthusiasm, whether it was Schelling’s particularly volatile idealism or
his Naturphilosophie that stirred Coleridge’s religious anxieties. Writing to Green,
he commented that ‘as soon as [Schelling] commenced the Objective or Naturwissenschaft, he gave the Slip’ to the I Am and in ‘his Jarbücher der Medicin
fairly involved it’ in the It Is, leaving ‘both in the Lurch.’5050. Ibid., 4.874.View all
notes At this point, even the transcendental philosophy that seemed so
‘revolution[ary]’ in BL5151. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 163.View all notes was
bothering Coleridge, as he sensed that it contained its own unravelling into
nature. Thus in new marginalia on the Introduction to the Outline, he takes aim at
Schelling’s claim that transcendental and natural philosophy are ‘one science,
differentiated only by the opposing orientations of their tasks.’5252. Schelling,
‘Introduction to the Outline,’ 194.View all notes He sees Schelling’s ‘unconscious
activity that acts intelligently without intelligence’ as a contradiction, accusing him
of not distinguishing ‘primary’ from ‘secondary’ or ‘reflective consciousness.’5353.
Coleridge, ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.374.View all notes Of
course this is the point of FO’s extraordinary experiment in grasping nature as
pure primary process, which can be done only through a reflective invasion that
is itself reconfigured by this process.

What concerns Coleridge even in the transcendental philosophy is that if nature
is immanently self-organizing, if nature develops into intelligence rather than
under its direction, then mind too risks becoming autogenetic and escaping the
control of a higher term. Put differently, Schelling’s notion of dynamic evolution is
oriented to growth, and this growth and the growth of the mind it opens up (to
evoke Wordsworth) threaten to unbalance the argument from design. Coleridge
thus reacts against ‘making Nature absolute.’ He further complains that Schelling
does not posit a ‘genesis’ of matter and motion (and thus a divine origin) but
assumes ‘the eternity of the material universe’ in ‘a succession which is it’s [sic]
own predecessor’; consequently ‘God is not self-sufficing … not GOD, but a part
of the universe, nay a product of the same. This indeed Schelling has dared
assert in his Denkmal.’ Put differently, Schelling introduces ‘polarity’ into the
‘unity of a perfect Will’ or ‘Godhead,’ polarity being not the expansive and
contracting drives in nature that Schelling often evokes, but the philosophical
poles of ‘Transcendental Idealism … and Nature.’5454. Coleridge, Notebooks,
3.4449; and Collected Letters, 4.873–4.View all notes This bi-polar God and the
bi-polar mind needed to comprehend him, go far beyond any comfortable
pantheism of the ‘One Life,’ making God a ‘life,’ ‘subject to suffering and
becoming.’5555. Schelling, Freedom, 66.View all notes
Coleridge’s critique goes to the heart of Schelling’s work which, in turning to the
‘ideal part’ of philosophy in the Freedom essay,5656. Ibid., 4.View all
notes performs a reverse Aufhebung that makes the philosophy of nature a
feedback loop which involves the very ground of philosophy in its ungrounding.
Green chose to ignore this detailed reading of Schelling in the higher service of
inventing a philosophical authority to contain the religious threat posed by the life
sciences. But we should not too decisively use Coleridge’s ill-tempered letter to
Green about the ‘rotten parts’ and ‘vacua’ of Schelling’s ‘foundation’ to construct
Coleridge’s thinking in the same clear line. Coleridge turned against Fichte and
then returned to the bulwark Fichte provided.5757. Coleridge, Collected Letters,
4.793, 873–5.View all notes His speculative waverings around ‘Schelling’ are
rhizomatically threaded through letters and notebooks as well as the persona he
adopted in published work that uses political theology to put fences around
natural philosophy: namely Aids to Reflection and Church and State. Coleridge
does indeed grow more critical of Schelling, and commentators like Raimonda
Modiano have therefore seen him as completing his own very different system or,
in Paul Hamilton’s intriguing argument, the system of which the Schelling of the
positive philosophy was in search.5858. Modiano, Coleridge, 160, 186–204; and
Hamilton, Coleridge and German Philosophy, 122–3.View all notes But
‘Schelling’ is better seen as a space for projecting, disavowing, yet secretly
holding onto solutions and irresolvable issues about the relationship among
idealism, nature, and religion.

For there is nothing systematic about Coleridge, whose notebooks exemplify
Schelling’s claim that the desire for a system indicates that knowledge ‘does not
exist in a system’ but is an ‘asystaton,’ ‘in inner conflict.’ Schelling may want to
overcome this asystasy in unity, but also argues that this ‘irresolvable’ conflict
must be ‘developed in every possible direction,’ which means that a ‘truly free
philosophy’ has to ‘leave everything,’ even ‘God.’5959. Schelling, ‘Nature of
Philosophy,’ 213, 217.View all notes Clearly this would not suit Coleridge. Yet the
fact that Coleridge wrote an essay on scrofula at the same time as the
vitalist TL mirrors both Schelling’s inclusion of an Appendix on disease alongside
the Stufenfolge in FO, and the similar problems about vitality and (de)generation
raised by Hunter’s corpus. Nor does Coleridge overcome this duality, as he
continues to read and translate German medical texts while writing Church and
State. Thus I suggest that Schelling’s asystasy is the underside of Coleridge’s
political theology. The nervous structure of the oxymoron ‘political theology’ can
be seen in Coleridge’s early poem ‘The Eolian Harp,’ which flirts with pantheism,
admittedly a simple pantheism that imagines a pre-established harmony in ‘all of
animated nature’ (l.44), and not the ontologically devastating exposure of ‘God’ to
finitude we find in Schelling’s Freedom essay. At the end, Coleridge invokes a
higher term to close off his ‘vain Philosophy’ (l.57), or rather an ambiguously
gendered placeholder for this authority, his wife, whom he addresses as ‘Meek
daughter in the family of Christ.’ (l.53). The awkward language suggests
Coleridge’s uncertain relationship to this ‘family’ that is both required and stifling
and indeed suggests Coleridge’s precarious participation in all the families he
would construct: personal, scientific, and theological.
A similar misfit between framing and content drives TL which, though
unpublished, continues to worry Coleridge’s thinking with the aporias of
Schelling’s work. Coleridge was drawn to German thought because of its
‘Encyclopedic Breadth,’ and even in mid-1818 saw Schelling as unifying
subjective and objective poles. That this project may be ‘too ambitious’6060.
Coleridge, Collected Letters, 4.667, 792, 863.View all notes is the sign that
encyclopedic breadth is precisely what opens up an unavoidable asystasy.
German thought spurred Coleridge to imagine his own organization of
knowledge, which in mid-1818 he rethought as a ‘descent’ from Theology,
through Ethics and Logic, to Zoology and Physics.6161. Ibid., 4.864.View all
notes But the hints towards an organization of knowledge in TL take the more
Idealist form of an ‘ascent’: a form based on Schelling’s Stufenfolge and used by
Hegel to anchor an ascent of disciplines. In TL Coleridge, while tracing nature’s
evolution from inorganic to organic and from polypi to mammalia also gestures
towards an epistemic ascent through the corresponding disciplines of physics,
geology, and physiology. In an uncanny coincidence with Hegel, each science
forms a ‘circle’ that is an ‘arc’ or ‘station’ in the ‘absolute science of Life,’ from
whence begins a ‘new series beyond … physiology’6262. Coleridge, Theory of

Life, 516, 519n, 551.View all notes: what Schelling calls the ideal as opposed to
real series. The issue of ascent vs. descent is that of an immanently unfolding
development vs. a transcendentally guaranteed deduction of both life and
knowledge.
At the heart of TL is what Schelling calls the Stufenfolge, by which nature
organizes itself in an ascending scale of complexity, through ‘continuous
deviations’ from the ‘ideal,’ but as ‘one organism [Organisation] inhibited at
various stages.’6363. Schelling, First Outline, 43, 53.View all notes This dynamic
evolution is an adaptation of the more static hierarchy of classes in the Chain of
Being, but for both Schelling and Coleridge, it is an ‘idea,’ and not the actual
biological evolution envisioned by either Darwin.6464. Ibid., 49.View all notes The
immediate occasion for TLwas the Abernethy–Lawrence debate over religion vs.
science, focalized through Hunter’s work. The Museum contained everything
from fossils to preserved parts of living creatures, thus opening the porous
borders between organisms of which man is only one species. Responding to
this array which was still being organized in the 1830s, Coleridge asks what ‘life’
is, answering this question both physiologically and physiogonically, in Green’s
later terminology. Physiologically, Coleridge concurs with Hunter that life cannot
consist in organization, which may precede it but is merely mechanical. But
where Hunter decouples life and organization, making the vital principle
something aleatory and unspecified, for Coleridge organization also remains a
minimal condition of qualitative life: a crystal is superior to an amoeba. It is this
which leads to his strong emphasis on ‘individuation’ as the combining of parts
into a whole, but within a ‘progressive’ ‘ladder’ of being or ‘gradative evolution,’
Green’s term for the Stufenfolge which anchors his physiogony.6565.
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 510, 533; and Green, Vital Dynamics, 39.View all notes
But Coleridge has difficulty with this paradigm that tries to immunize a normative
‘nature’ against a ‘life’ that, for Schelling, exceeds it.6666. Schelling, First Outline,
62, 160n.View all notes For in nature’s proliferating details, the corals and polypi
complicate the ascent from vegetation to animalization necessary to
individuation. Indeed, Coleridge cannot put vegetation and animalization in a
sequence and sends them in different, branching directions; yet they also meet in
the corals and polypi, confusing what he wants to separate.6767.
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 538–9.View all notes Nor does the increasing
complexity of organisms align with their increasing integration, as Green knew it
must do for physiological constitution to provide an argument from design that
supports the health of the body politic. For the body’s subsystems threaten the
balance between individuation and integration. Thus in 1822, Coleridge writes of
the relations of ‘the different parts of the Body’ to the ‘nervous system’ and ‘the
nerves themselves to the Brain’ and says that ‘the polypus nature of every nerve’
means that each part not only has ‘relations to its centre’ but is ‘a center in itself.’

It seems then that the human body is a ‘network’ of hyperindividuations rather
than a ‘graduated series of functions.’6868. Coleridge, Notebooks, 4.4865;
and Theory of Life, 539.View all notes For Schelling too, it proves impossible to
achieve this graduated series of functions fused into ‘ONE force,’ as the body
ramifies into ‘individual systems of specialized excitability’ that make
‘organization’ an ‘involution’ of ‘system within system.’6969. Schelling, First
Outline, 127, 141, 149.View all notes
Hunter is supposed to resolve these problems, and contemporaries tried to
narrativize his cabinet of curiosities as a natural history museum that
demonstrates the Stufenfolge. But there is no naturalized theodicy in Hunter’s
empiricism, which led him to collect as many diverse, mutant specimens of life as
he could. Coleridge therefore turns from the Museum to Hunter’s ‘writings’ to
‘guid[e]’ him towards the ‘unity of the Creator.’ But these writings are full of
‘obscurities’ and ‘contradictions.’ Indeed, Hunter’s physiology presents a network
of nerves, blockages, and anastomoses that figures the very structure of his
writings. So two years later, in the Essays on ‘Method,’ Coleridge turns back from
writings where Hunter never found ‘the compleating Word’ to the Museum,
where, absolved from language, he constructed the ‘idea’ for ‘scientific
apprehension out of the alphabet of nature.’7070. Coleridge, Theory of Life, 586;
and The Friend, 1.474, 474n1.View all notes This mystification, and the
hermeneutic circling between the writings and Museum as supplements to each
other, exposes Hunter as an inadequate prosthesis, sustained by what others
projected onto him.7171. Coleridge could not have read much by Hunter on life.
The published work available by 1816–1819 was on gunshot wounds, venereal
disease, and teeth but not comparative anatomy. Coleridge probably had an
impression of Hunter’s theories from John Abernethy, who sanitized him for his
own purposes. Even organization of the Museum did not begin in earnest till
1823.View all notes Thus, the ‘august temple’ of Hunter’s corpus resembles
nothing more than the ‘Gothic cathedral’ Coleridge uses to figure his own halfunwritten theory of imagination in the contemporaneous BL. While TL was simply
not published, in BLColeridge actually published a letter from a ‘friend’ advising
him not to publish his theory.7272. Coleridge, Theory of Life, 586; and Biographia
Literaria, 300–4.View all notes This curious subterfuge draws attention to the
deferral of publication as a way of writing under erasure. Schelling enters both
these texts as a zone of disavowal, openings, and untraversed difficulties. For
the infamous plagiarisms in both texts are a way for Coleridge not to put in his
own words a unifying idealism that cannot be grounded in Schelling either.
Plagiarism holds together in a bipolar short-circuit a simultaneous enthusiasm for
and doubt about this unity.
In TL as Hunter proves inadequate, Schelling and Naturphilosophie are
introduced to support the One Life. But again, Schelling is a hypotyposis, and the

fact that he is nowhere mentioned intimates an anxiety about the Pandora’s box
he might open: a danger intrinsic to any idealism that wants to be a realism. Yet
Schelling is throughout the text in the language of indifference and polarity, which
continues in Coleridge’s work well after 1816. More specifically FO is in the
background of TL and is particularly unsettling to any pure idealism because it
goes beyond the still abstract dynamic physics of Ideas for a Philosophy of
Nature and takes up the history of nature as the complex (de)construction of this
very idea of a history. Though Coleridgeans only discuss the Introduction and
never FO, it was bound and annotated with the former in the copy Coleridge
read. It enters TL in the tension between a ‘positive’ force of ‘attachment or
reduction’ into the universal life and a force of ‘detachment’: a ‘negative’ and
‘limitative power, constantly acting to individualize’ and ‘figure the former.’ The
striking word ‘figure,’ which is central to FO, is worth noting.7373.
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 515, 557; and Notebooks, 3.4449. If Coleridge did
indeed write TL in 1819 (see note 22 above), he would just have been rereading FO.View all notes Finally, of all Schelling’s texts, it is FO that most fully
works through the Stufenfolge.
For although Schelling does touch on the Stufenfolge in STI,7474.
Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 122–6.View all notes in making it
a preface and portion of the history of spirit, he avoids the conceptual and
material details in FO that complicate this history, which are everywhere
in TL and the Notebooks long after 1818. Importantly, in FO, Schelling cannot
ground the Stufenfolge. Though it is his favored system, it is only one of many
possible systems, unsettled by his ‘dynamic atomism,’ his uncertainty about the
role of chemistry, and his volatile physiology described above. At the center
of FO is the tension between the ‘universal organism’ of nature and the individual
which is a ‘limit to its activity,’ which nature ‘labours to destroy.’ ‘Individual
natures’ that detach themselves from a gradative evolution are ‘misbegotten
attempts,’ even while this ‘separation’ of botched products from the worldprocess is necessary for deducing the Stufenfolge, since without it these entities
would not be ‘permanent’ and thus discernible as individual stages.7575.
Schelling, First Outline, 35, 39–41, 53–4.View all notes But since Coleridge,
more than Schelling, also makes individuation the motor of the Stufenfolge, it
seems that the individuation which forwards dynamic evolution holds it back, as
individual natures develop independently, resisting the will in nature. Coleridge
tries to avoid this problem by positing something like a Hegelian Aufhebung to
theorize a logical evolution that simulates a material evolution. Discussing the
superiority of fish to insects, he also discerns an inferiority in their mode of
impregnation and concludes that every ‘grade of ascension’ is accompanied by
‘an apparent retrograde movement’ but that when nature ‘drops a faculty’ she
always ‘pick[s] it up’ again at a higher level.7676. Coleridge, Theory of Life, 546–
8.View all notes Thus ‘in the idea of each power, the lower derives

it’s intelligibility from the higher,’ while ‘each higher implies a lower in order to it’s
actual existence [sic].’ In a fragment on ‘The Scale of Life,’ he also writes that
‘parts are seen’ whose ‘full purpose’ is ‘realized higher up in the scale,’ so that
the higher finds its ‘history’ in the lower which is a ‘vita uterina,’ ‘prophetical’ of
the higher.7777. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 6.597–8; and Scale of Life,
1194.View all notes
Yet the details of the Stufenfolge unsettle the paradigm. This complication also
disturbs any ‘Stufenfolge’ of the ‘Wissenschaften,’7878. This is Schelling’s phrase
in ‘Vorlesungen’ (261). The English translation in On University Studies (55) is
imprecise.View all notes hence the idea does not appear in later published work,
which only discusses the relation between life and organization.7979.
Coleridge, History of Philosophy, 2.524–5.View all notes Hence also why a
‘descent’ of the disciplines from Theology seemed safer than an ascent in 1818,
and why in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana, which was completed by others
including F.D. Maurice, the volumes follow an ascent through the sciences of
spirit, followed by a descent into those of nature, and then an array of other
fields.8080. Coleridge dissociated himself from EM, re-publishing his Introduction
as the Essays on Method in The Friend. However, it is not the arrangement of
volumes that annoyed him, but their mixed systematic-alphabetic arrangement,
which brought EM closer to the Encyclopedia Britannicawhich it was supposed to
counter.View all notes The Metropolitana was a conservative reaction not only
against the more modern Encyclopédie and Encyclopedia Britannica, but also
against the Idealist encyclopedics of Hegel, Schelling, and Novalis. But in
unpublished work from 1822–1828, Coleridge remained fascinated by an ascent
of life, whose problematic nature made letters, fragments, and notebooks the
appropriate place for his protean speculations. As a philosopher of science,
Coleridge wanted ‘evolution as contra-distinguished from apposition, or
superinduction ab aliunde.’8181. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 6.599.View all
notes In the process, he was sensitive to the fact that life could behave
pathologically as well as normally, and less inclined than Abernethy and Green to
bracket disease as an aberration from health. That Coleridge wrote an essay on
scrofula alongside the vitalist TL mirrors Schelling’s inclusion of an Appendix on
disease alongside the Stufenfolge in FO, whose devastating consequences for
freedom Krell outlines.8282. Krell, Contagion, 74–6, 94, 112–14.View all notes
Returning to the disciplines, the problem posed by a descent is that it is, finally,
‘superinduction.’ So Coleridge continues to speculate after 1818 on an ascent
from physics to zoology to theology, wanting a quasi-material QED in the form of
an evolution.8383. See note 40 above.View all notes But the problem here is
philosophy. One of Schelling’s differences with Jacobi in
the Pantheismusstreit had to do with Schelling’s belief that one could not have
theology – the summit for Coleridge – without philosophy. Philosophy, Coleridge

writes in a notebook entry that moves from the scale of nature to the scale of
disciplines, is not a ‘Science; but a Supplement of Science,’ originating ‘in the
feeling of a desideratum not supplied by any one Science’ nor the sciences
collectively. ‘Supplement’ does not mean, as it does elsewhere, that philosophy
is a handmaiden in the ‘realization’ of another science. Yet although philosophy
here arises from a lack, Coleridge still wants to think it progressively, writing that
it has three stages: ‘incipient, progressive, and conclusive or final.’8484. Ibid.,
4.4517, 4673.View all notes Nevertheless, it is the incipient that holds his
attention, as a desideratum of ‘self-seeking’ rather than ‘self-finding,’ ‘a residuum
of darkness common to all’ sciences.8585. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 6.599;
and Notebooks, 4.4517 (cf. Collected Letters, 4.863).View all notes
Thus Coleridge writes that if theology fails ‘in its professed Object’ of solving ‘the
Problems left unsolved’ by lower sciences, including their ‘darkness or residua,’
its failure as ‘the Science of Sciences … gives rise to incipient Philosophy.’ We
are not dealing here with a science ‘sink[ing]’ into a lower one, in order to be
sublated back into a ‘circle’ as the lowest point is brought up to the ‘apex.’8686.
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 519n.View all notesWe might expect such
an Aufhebung, which Coleridge earlier in the entry attributes to the scale of
nature. But since philosophy is not a science, though not entirely ‘heterogeneous’
to science, it cannot be sublated; it cannot simply be made the ‘transit from
paganism to religion.’8787. Coleridge, History of Philosophy, 1.285–6.View all
notes To adapt Foucault, philosophy is at once ‘essential and inessential–a
border that is peripheral to the centre, but which never stops referring to and
interrogating it.’8888. Coleridge, Notebooks, 4.4517; and Foucault, Introduction to
Kant’s Anthropology, 120.View all notes Philosophy is the unsettling margin that
accompanies every science which sees itself as progressing towards
conclusiveness, yet always risks falling back into incipience. This ‘meta’ function
does not make it the science of sciences, but rather means that it is the interior
and residuum of all sciences because it always exceeds and cannot entirely be
subsumed into other sciences. This is what we saw in TL when Coleridge added
philosophy to the life sciences to make them progressive, but in the process
elevated material details to the level of philosophical problems that resulted in the
text falling back into incipience. It is also what he fears happening to theology.
For although Coleridge also says that philosophy exists only when theology fails,
and though he insists that theology is self-grounding because God is ‘the ground
of its own existence,’ he ends by writing: ‘Thus, the failure of Theology … gives
rise to incipient Philosophy’(emphasis mine).8989. See note 40 above.View all
notes Buried somewhere in this entry is also Schelling’s profound complication in
the Freedom essay of what it means for God to be self-grounding, namely that if
God is the ground of (his) existence, then God contains the ground, and is in the
ground of which he is the ground.9090. Ibid., 4.4728.View all notes For Schelling,
too philosophy bears on ‘all things’ and so cannot be limited to being

a Fachwissenschaft or defined subject.9191. Schelling, On University Studies, 79–
81.View all notes And it is as philosophy that ‘Schelling’ continues to haunt
Coleridge. Apart from direct references to him, well after the ‘turn’ in 1818, the
language of polarity, indifference, ground, powers, and copula is threaded
through the Notebooks9292. For Coleridge’s continued reading of Schelling,
see Notebooks, 4.4641, 4776, 4778, 4839 See 4538, 4641, 4663, 4776, 4784,
4797, 4843, 4998, 5243, 5290, 5406, etc.View all notes and carries with it a
residuum of darkness that draws Coleridge’s differences from Schelling, on
which his natural and political theology are based, back into incipience.
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